Abstract. After the battle of Thapsus that took place on 6 April 46 Caesar kept delaying his return to Rome for a long while, until 25 July -he stopped to stay on Sardinia -and this cannot be attributed fully to implementing measures and actions necessary in Africa since they could have been carried out by his new proconsul, C. Sallustius Crispus too. The triumph held owing to the victory in Africa -in which they carried around representations of the death of M. Petreius, M. Porcius Cato and Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica -must have further grated on the nerves of the aristocracy of Rome, because it was meant to symbolise Caesar's victory both over Iuba and the senate. It was after that that Cicero broke his silence and delivered Pro Marcello in the senate, which was both oratio suasoria and gratiarum actio for the pardon granted to Marcellus, by which Caesar wanted to assure the senate of his benevolence and wanted to show off his power by his autocratic gesture. Pro Ligario delivered in 46 has been considered a classical example of deprecatio by both the antique and modern literature, and in historical terms it is not a less noteworthy work since from the period following the civil war Pro Marcello, having been delivered in early autumn of 46 in the senate, is Cicero's fi rst oration made on the Forum, that is, before the general public, in which praising Caesar's clementia he seemingly legitimised dictatorship. First, we describe the historical background of the oratio and the process of the proceedings (I.); then, we examine the issue if the proceedings against Ligarius can be considered a real criminal trial. (II.) After the analysis of the genre of the speech, deprecatio (III.) we analyse the appearance of Caesar's clementia in Pro Ligario. (IV.) Finally, we focus on the means of style of irony, and highlight an interesting element of the Caesar-Cicero relation and how the orator voices his conviction that he considers the dictator's power and clementia illegitimate. (V.)
entire term of the war in Africa and did not assume any part in war actions; yet, he could not have been a really signifi cant person since the author of Bellum Africanum does not mention him by name. Caesar's pardon was not rare at all as the dictator gave amnesty to everybody who surrendered without fi ght in the war in Africa; only a few even of the chiefs were killed, e.g. Afranius and Faustus Sulla captivated during fi ght -whether it was done on the direct orders of Caesar 12 or without his knowledge is disputed. 13 This is fully supported by Cicero's statement when he speaks about a victory where only armed persons were killed. 14 However, a granted pardon did not give permit to return to Italy. Ligarius's relatives turned to Cicero as early as in the summer of 46 asking him to use his infl uence with Caesar to allow Ligarius to return to Italy, and in letters with highly offi cial tone dated in August and September 46 respectively -which does not certify that they maintained any friendly relation -the orator assured Ligarius of his help. 15 It is not known what kind of relationship Cicero maintained with the otherwise not too signifi cant Ligarii known only for their hostile emotions towards Caesar and what role Cicero's ceaseless fi nancial diffi culties played in undertaking the case. It is possible that it was Brutus's mediation that made Cicero undertake the case. On the other hand, for a long while Cicero did not have any direct contact with the dictator, only with his environment, e.g. with Pansa, Hirtius and Postumus. 16 In Ligarius's matter, together with Ligarius's brothers he made efforts to get close to Caesar through mediators and disclose the matter to him. 17 This was not an easy task because, among others, Caesar took a dislike to those who were involved in the war in Africa and wanted to keep them in uncertainty by delaying their return; 18 Cicero encouraged Ligarius by asserting that his troubles would be soon solved for Caesar's anger lessened from day to day. 19 His next letter more resolutely voiced the hope in the opportunity of returning home soon 20 as having undertaken the somewhat humiliating situation to ask for audience as a senator consularis from Caesar four years younger than him, not being above him at all in the hierarchy of the Republic, Cicero was granted personal hearing by Caesar where he appeared together with Ligarius's brothers, who threw themselves to the ground at the dictator's feet, and Cicero delivered a speech. 21 To all that Caesar responded generously, which made giving amnesty unquestionable in Cicero's eyes, however, it could not be considered a completed fact (Walser 1959: 92; Mc Dermott 1970: 321 ff.).
So, Ligarius's case was in a fair way to get solved to satisfy everybody when in the last days of September 46 the son of Lucius Tubero, the former governor, Q. Aelius Tubero brought a charge against Ligarius, which he wanted to support primarily by asserting that Ligarius -and Varus -had not let him land in Africa, in the province assigned to them by the senate (Kunkel 1967: 37) . Perhaps the charges included the relation maintained with Iuba as enemy and high treason implemented thereby. At the same time, it should be mentioned at the outset that in Pro Ligario delivered in October on the Forum Cicero did not touch on the legally relevant charges, however, by his speech -his speech made before the general public for the fi rst time in the period following the civil war -he seemingly legitimised Caesar's dictatorship (Walser 1959: 90) .
The defence was provided by C. Vibius Pansa, one of Caesar's closest men -governor of Bithynia and Pontus in 47 and 46, governor of Gallia Cisalpina in 45, then, on Caesar's proposal, consul designatus of the year 43, together with A. Hirtius -and by Cicero. Regarding the progress of the case it is worth mentioning Plutarch's account. 22 Thus, Plutarch presumed that the outcome of the proceedings had been determined right from the outset, namely, it was a decided fact for Caesar that Ligarius was guilty and would be convicted and it was only the power of Cicero's eloquence that turned the fl ow of events. Caesar's pardon produced its effect: in March 44 Ligarius was one of Caesar's assassins, 23 then he and his family became the victim of the proscriptiones ordered by Antonius and Octavianus (Walser 1959: 93) .
It is a fact that Caesar pardoned Ligarius and let him return to Italy, however, the following doubts arise with regard to Plutarch's version 24 (Kumaniecki 1967 : 440 ff.; Loutsch 1984: 98-110; Craig 1984: 193-199) . If Caesar -as Cicero's letter asserts -did not entertain hostile emotions against Ligarius, why did he allow the proceedings to take place? There might have been two reasons for that: he either wanted to infl ict punishment on Tubero or wanted to provide powerful propaganda for his own clementia by forgiveness. The intention to convict Ligarius is highly improbable since Cicero did not put forward any new charges that would not have been known to him at the time of writing his letter dated late November, describing Caesar's intentions. 25 Furthermore, Pansa, being the dictator's confi dant, would not have undertaken the defence of Ligarius, if it had been decided from the outset that he was guilty, and Caesar would not have assigned defence to Pansa, if he had not wanted to give pardon to Ligarius (Rochlitz 1993: 118) . Caesar was very much aware that Ligarius did not have great infl uence among Pompey's adherents and that the events in Africa were controlled by Varus, Cato, Matellus and Labieus. By that Caesar wanted to send a message to Attius Varus and Labienus fi ghting in Hispania: they had not lost all of their chances for settling the confl ict with as little blood sacrifi ce as possible (Walser 1959: 95) .
It seems to be more probable that Caesar decided to acquit Ligarius in order to prove his by then proverbial generosity again. Yet, it was just the appearance of this intention that had to be avoided by all means: as Caesar had no other purpose by the proceedings than have his clementia celebrated through acquitting Ligarius, for this reason, he put on the mask of the angry judge having been already convinced of Ligarius's depravity who could be moved by Cicero's eloquence only (Kumaniecki 1967: 442) . Caesar as a master of political propaganda must have gladly grasped the opportunity offered for playing the role that his clementia was brought to the surface and shaped Ligarius's fate favourably owing to the effi cient oration of the counsel for the defence only (Kumaniecki 1967: 439) . It cannot be ruled out that for Caesar -using Cicero's role taking for his own goals -the Ligarius case might have also served to enable him to convince those of his adherents who 22 Plutarchus, Cicero 39, 5-6. 23 Regarding this view Wilhelm Drumann does not qualify Cicero's role specifi cally, yet, knowing his damning judgement on the orator-statesman he could not have formed a positive picture of it since elsewhere -very much in bad faith -he presents Cicero as an extremely vain fi gure who overestimates himself, is heated by the desire to be in the public eye, lacks clear political vision, and overtly humbles to potentes (Drumann-Groebe 1899-1929: III. 63). The question can be estimated with greater subtlety from the works of Matthias Gelzer and Justinus Klass if we presume that Cicero, using Caesar's propaganda, tried to realise his own program: the more supporters of Pompey were granted pardon, the more chances he could see for strengthening the situation of the optimates, which in the long run could make (could have made) it possible to restore the order of the state of the Republic. To this end, it was indispensable to force Caesar somehow to implement his announced fundamental principles (Klass 1939 : 188 f.). Handling the situation required great sense of tactics, seeming subordination, internal resoluteness and external fl exibility from Cicero. Caesar's later acts, the battle at Munda and Ides of March 44 proved that both Cicero and Caesar had wrongly surveyed the efforts of the other party and the political party (Walser 1959: 96) .
Clementia showed towards Ligarius was addressed not only to Pompey's adherents fi ghting against Caesar in Africa but also to those preparing for another war in Hispania, and Cicero's participation in the proceedings provided suffi cient publicity for the case as well as the appearance of objectivity manifested by Caesar (McDermott 1970: 325) . At the same time, Pro Ligario made it possible for Cicero -although it might have seemed to be shameless fl attery in the eye of the adherents of the Republic 26 -to enforce his own political goals, i.e., to try to make the dictator committed to follow his conciliatory policy, and to fi nd as many causes for exculpation for the supporters of Pompey as possible (Kumaniecki 1967: 453; Fuhrmann 1991: 34) . Cicero, however, presumably -contrary to Gerold Walser's view, who interprets the Ligarius case as demonstration of Cicero's vanity and overestimation of his own role -took part in the play directed by Caesar not because he was driven by political blindness and hybris, as it were believing that by his orator's ingenuity he could deceit and enchant the dictator's clear political vision (Walser 1959: 96) . Much rather his concerns formulated in the letter written to Servius Sulpicius Rufus were realised: 27 again he was compelled to take a position and as it were became extortable -if we take his promises made to his friends who lost favour, e.g. Ligarius seriously (Rochlitz 1993: 119) . 28 On the other hand, if he did not want to get again into open hostility with Caesar, he could not refuse to legitimise his peace policy by taking position, which policy most probably had some attraction for Cicero too since it was the only thing that could bring some kind of remedy for the empire having been exhausted in the civil war (DrumannGroebe 1899-1929: III. 637; Kumaniecki 1967: 457). Cicero was also as much of a political realist to size up that it was impossible to avoid public life turning into sheer anarchy without some kind of compromise between the parties. Yet, he did not let Caesar use his talent as unprincipled tool: in Pro Ligario he ceaselessly makes an effort to certify excusable errors of Pompey's adherents and does not omit to criticise the dictator's status and the general conditions of Rome (Rochlitz 1993: 120) .
Regarding the procedure followed by Caesar, there are certain similarities with his conduct engaged when granting pardon to Marcellus. Caesar himself was also interested in calling Marcellus back from exile; on the one hand, he wanted to demonstrate his generosity again; and, on the other hand, he wanted to advance legitimisation of dictatorship by the fact that a fi rm adherent of the republic such as Marcellus also returned home and acquiesced in the changes in political conditions, and by accepting the pardon granted to him as it were acknowledged it. In spite of the fact that Marcellus's homecoming was a previously resolved fact, the dictator's propaganda was meant to create the impression that Caesar bowed to the senate's request only when he called the republican Marcellus back from exile. Caesar's father-in-law, Piso mentioned Marcellus's name seemingly accidentally in his speech delivered in the senate, 29 upon which Marcellus's cousin with identical name 30 threw himself on the ground at Caesar's feet to beg for pardon for his kin, then the senators also rose from their seat and asked Caesar to exercise mercy. The dictator, after having complained at length about Marcellus's faults, seemingly utterly unexpectedly declared that he would not be averse to the wish of the senate. This was followed by noisy applause of the senate and Cicero's speech, in which Cicero praised his human eminence. Presumably, a similar choreography can be observed in Ligarius's case too. If Caesar had let Ligarius return home without special proceedings, he would have missed an important occasion to propagate his policy advocating conciliation. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to give an answer to the question whether Tubero had acted against Ligarius upon Caesar's instruction or the dictator merely made use of the occasion being offered.
II
Pro Ligario raises several questions that can be answered with diffi culties. Why did Cicero not use the obvious argument in his statement of the defence that Ligarius's independent power of decision was highly restricted in Africa since governance was in the hands of Varus and Cato, so it was not Ligarius on whom the alliance entered into with Iuba turned? Why did Cicero did not strive to refute the charges made by Tubero? Why did Cicero undertake the case although he otherwise maintained good relations with the Tuberos and almost none with the Ligarii? (Walser 1959 accuses a man who makes a confession or a man whose case -i.e. political record -is better than or at least the same as his. 32 The charge is determined by Bauman as maiestas imminuta or as crimen maiestatis imminutae. The facts of the case that can be deduced from the described historical situation would have later belonged under lex Iulia maiestatis, and as this statute of Augustus repeats the elements of earlier legislation, it can be made probable that we can qualify Ligarius's act treason (Baumann 1967 : 142 ff.; Kunkel 1974: 94 f.). On the other hand, it is important to add that the term maiestas does not occur at all in the entire Pro Ligario, and Cicero does not determine the legal nature of the charges either (Bringmann 1986: 73) .
Also, it is against the concept of regular criminal action that the proceedings were conducted in the absence of the accused, i.e. Ligarius. Although Roman legal practice did not exclude conviction in absentia, however, the accused had to be called to appear before the law before commencement of the lawsuit (Mommsen 1899: 332 ff.). Ligarius did not get such summons, what is more, it is a cardinal point of his case that Caesar prohibited him to enter the territory of Italy. Furthermore, the lawsuit conducted due to maiestas imminuta would have belonged before the quaestio perpetua de maiestate set up by Sulla since Sulla's court of justice reforms were not abrogated by Caesar, he changed only the lists that formed the basis of the scope of jurors and the scope of identity of jurors; 33 this measure presumably constituted part of the reforms of the year 46. The proceedings, however, were conducted not before the quaestio de maiestate as it could be expected but before Caesar personally as judicial forum, in whose hands Ligarius's fate was placed (Bringmann 1986: 75) .
Similarly, it is against the validity of crimen maiestatis as a charge that the alliance entered into with Iuba, King of Numidia against Caesar would have been its implementation in practice 34 (Neumeister 1964: 47; Kumaniecki 1967: 439) . However, the fact of the alliance with Iuba was known to Caesar already at the time of granting pardon to Ligarius, after the battle at Thapsus, so a charge based thereon would not have brought anything new to the knowledge of the dictator (Rochlitz 1993: 117) .
The interpretation provided by Theodor Mommsen offers a possible solution for these diffi culties; he asserts that the imperium of magistrates contains the right of the judge to pass a judgement in criminal proceedings too (Mommsen 1899: 35 ff.; Mommsen 1887-1888: I. 126; II. 735). Although the power of administration of justice of the magistrate was restricted by the legal institution of provocatio ad populum, this did not apply to extraordinary imperia, that is, the decemvirate of the 5 th century, the second triumvirate and the dictatura rei publicae constituendae (he ranks both Sulla's and Caesar's dictatorship under the latter) (Mommsen 1899: 35) . This view is fundamentally shaken by Jochen Bleicken and Wolfgang Kunkel by stating that provocatio protected the Roman citizen from the unlawful coercitio (disciplinary power) of the magistrate, however, produced no infl uence at all on iudicatio (administration of criminal justice) activity (Bleicken 1975 : 324 f.; Kunkel 1962: 25 ff.). Caesar's dictatorship does not mean extraordinary imperium in the sense interpreted by Theodor Mommsen since he never took the title dictator rei publicae constituendae (legibus scribundis) (Bringmann 1986: 75 Even Theodor Mommsen refers to a single example of the application of this extraordinary punitive power only: Ligarius's case (Mommsen 1887-1888: II. 735). He supports his statement by the lines of Pro Ligario which assert that the purpose of the prosecution is not to convict but to execute Q. Ligarius, 35 and that this could not have been carried out by anybody in this form even under Sulla, who sentenced to death everybody whom he hated: since there the dictator himself gave orders to kill the person without anybody demanding it. 36 To this Theodor Mommsen ties the following interpretation: the locus clearly proves that as a dictator Caesar passed a judgement over Ligarius as a judge and his competence was identical with that of Sulla (Mommsen 1887-1888: II. 735). It is just the punctum saliens, however, that the locus does not make clear, i.e. that in a criminal case Caesar exercised administration of justice as a magistrate; as Cicero's reference applies to the proscriptiones carried out by Sulla and does not mean to state that Sulla would have had his enemies executed after lawful investigation and declaring their guilt. It is public knowledge that Sulla was empowered by lex Valeria to have Roman citizens executed arbitrarily, without lawful sentence. 37 So, if Caesar's powers, by which he decided the fate of Ligarius, was identical with that of Sulla, then we must draw the conclusion that he obtained unlimited power over the losers of civil war -this seems to be supported also by the comment made by Cassius Dio.
38
Let us again examine the sentence of Pro Ligario considered to be of key importance by Theodor Mommsen, by which he wants to prove that the Ligarius case was actually court proceedings, specifi cally that the purpose of the prosecution was not to convict but to execute Q. Ligarius. 39 It is a fact that the purpose of each formal accusation is to convict the accused, in the present case, however, the opponent does not claim this, much rather to kill, execute Ligarius without any sentence. So, just as Sulla, Caesar can proceed against his enemies as he pleases, he is, however, characterised not by cruelty but by clementia, and it is just exercising this that Tubero wants to prevent him from. The outcome of the case was probably determined on the grounds of a scenario worked out in advance by Caesar, showing some similarities with the Marcellus case, specifi cally -in spite of the description provided by Plutarch -in favour of Ligarius. Regarding Plutarch's description it is worth quoting William C. McDermott's witty formulation word for word: "Thus, a sad picture of the orator emerges, no longer king of the courts, but courting a king" (McDermott 1970: 324) . As it is made clear by the events of the coming years: Cicero must have felt the same and did not forgive. The proceedings learned of from Pro Ligario cannot be considered a real criminal action because the decision was not in the hands of the quaestio de maiestate but in the hands of the dictator Caesar, who did not have any exceptional imperium that would have entitled him to pass a judgment on criminal cases affecting Roman citizens as a magistrate. 35 Cicero, Pro Ligario 11. 36 Ibid. 11-12. 37 
III
The above is also supported by the form of the speech; Pro Ligario is a so-called deprecatio, which is a tool of infl uencing arbitrary decisions of persons exercising power rather than a tool of the defence in court of justice as it is also noted by the author of Auctor ad Herennium 40 (Martin 1974: 28) . So, if Cicero chose a form for his speech that could not be used in court proceedings, 41 then this also makes it probable that in Ligarius's case the dictator adopted decision not as a magistrate acting as a judge. The orator himself declares that he turns to Caesar not as a judge. 42 Right at the beginning of the oration he emphasises that he considers his task is to raise Caesar's compassion rather than refute the charges 43 as most probably Pansa had already dealt with possible forms of refuting the charges (Kumaniecki 1967: 445) . The purpose of deprecatio is not defensio facti, i.e. the defence of a given act but ignoscendi postulatio, i.e. praying for remission of punishment to be imposed due to a committed act or error. 44 At the same time, it should be noted that Pro Ligario is not purely deprecatio but also a statement of the defence, as Cicero presents several fact-based arguments to defend Ligarius. 45 The usual elements of deprecatio are commonplaces (loci communes) meant to evoke misericordia, 46 so, for example, the audience's sympathy can be aroused by referring to humanitas, fortuna, misericordia and rerum commutatio. 47 Accordingly, deprecatio is not a genre of the court of justice, its scope of application is the senate and consilium -i.e. it must have been clear to the audience of the period that Cicero saw through the play of passing a judgment directed by Caesar and used it for his own benefi t (Rochlitz 1993: 121) .
The logically and psychologically proper arrangement of arguments, as a matter of fact, constitutes a tense structure in Pro Ligario too, and, accordingly, the misericordiatopoi fi lled with temper, meant to affect Caesar's clementia, were placed in the speech consciously (Neumeister 1964 : 71 ff.; Rochlitz 1993: 121). Already in the prooemium the orator makes it clear that he builds on Caesar's misericordia, 48 thus, he makes his audience aware of the fact that his purpose regarding Ligarius is not liberatio culpae since in his opinion his defendant has not committed crime by joining Pompey 49 but errati venia, i.e. obtaining forgiveness for taking erroneous position. 50 In accordance with that, the orator leads the thread of Tubero being a committed adherent of Pompey along the speech in order to reveal the real motivation of the accusation thereby.
The narratio, which is emphatically meant to outline the facts without emotions, 51 is followed by the argumantatio 52 that -contrary to the orator's promise -nevertheless serves the defence of Ligarius: especially the paragraphs contrasting the crudelitas of the Tuberos intending to restrict Caesar in exercising pardon with Ligarius's begging and tears as well as with Caesar's clementia, humanitas, misericordia and lenitas. 53 By that he turns Caesar's brightly gleaming clementia away from the prosecutors and as it were urges him to side with his defendant, and turns crudelitas that the Tuberos reproach Ligarius with around, and lets it fall back on the prosecutors (Neumeister 1964: 51; Rochlitz 1993: 122) . He deprives Ligarius's case of its individuality, and contrasts the general miseria of the civil war with misericordia showed by Caesar, general luctus with his lenitas, general crudelitas with the dictator's clementia. 54 The virtue of humanitas especially comes to the front for misericordia and clementia are its most beautiful forms of manifestation -since as Quintilianus expounds, it is just this that deprecatio intends to turn the attention of the target audience and the addressee of the speech to 55 (Nybakken 1939: 398) . By underlining Caesar's well-known humanitas Cicero as it were obliges the dictator to adhere to enforcing this virtue, 56 and reminds the Tuberos of studia humanitatis, which was once not alien to them either. 57 By that he again sets Caesar and the wing of his party urging for conciliation against the Tuberos desiring petty-minded revenge.
58
He makes it as it were obligatory for Caesar to keep to his principles formulated in his own propaganda since misericordia and lenitas are virtues frequently voiced during the civil war too; his humanitas can be certifi ed by his adherents and his clementia by the whole empire. By all that Cicero uses the key features of Caesar's self image as a tool for strengthening deprecatio (Rochlitz 1993: 123) . The following passages shed light on the purpose of these paragraphs heavily charged with emotions. 59 Here he tries to clear Ligarius of the scelus that even after Pompey's death he continued to fi ght against Caesar in alliance with the ruler of Numidia, Iuba, who was offi cially declared enemy by the senate by then having sided with the dictator (Kumaniecki 1967 : 442 ff.). It was just this difference, i.e. remaining loyal to Pompey even after his death, that the prosecutors wanted to emphasise and thereby to take the most important argument, i.e. that the Tuberos also fought on the side of Pompey, away from the defence (Bringmann 1986: 79) . In other words, the function of this part of the argumentatio highly charged with emotions is to win the dictator's sympathy for the benefi t of Ligarius and at the same time to help the orator to get over the pitfalls of his argumentation expounded regarding the desperate Pompeian position of the accused, while driving the attention of the audience and Caesar away from its logical pitfalls (Rochlitz 1993: 123 no other goal than to produce effect on the dictator's humanitas, clementia and misericordia, however, within the frameworks of praeteritio he does not omit to mention that he tried to refute the charges against Ligarius by fact-based arguments too 61 (Neumeister 1964: 54) . The task of peroratio is commovere, the effect produced on the decision-maker's emotions, 62 and in the case of deprecatio this aspect is reinforced because the orator underlines several elements from Ligarius's personality and deeds that were to move Caesar's emotions. So, for example, he stresses that his deeds were moved not by hatred against Caesar, 63 that he badly tolerates being far away from his brothers, 64 that he stayed in Africa not upon his own resolution but by being prevented by the storms of danger-fraught times of the civil war, 65 and that Ligarius's family had obtained several merits with regard to Caesar. 66 He points out that many people from all over Italy appeared in mourning to beg for Ligarius. 67 He refers to the pardon granted earlier by the dictator to others, 68 Caesar's clementia, 69 misericordia, 70 humanitas, 71 liberalitas, 72 bonitas, 73 and crowns all that by the praise that mortals having mercy on their fellow beings become similar to gods. 74 So, the orator used all the available tools of deprecatio, not omitting, beside ignoscendi postulatio, defensio facti eitherthereby, albeit, accepting the choreography set up by Caesar, using his clementia-and misericordia-propaganda for the benefi t of his defendant (Rochlitz 1993: 124) .
IV
In Pro Ligario both the term clementia 75 and misericordia 76 occur six times, and so rise to the most important form of conduct, feature demanded from and attributed in advance to Caesar. Here clementia means forgiving for error, 77 which Caesar is required to do in his capacity as father 78 -stressing father's characteristic is perhaps reference to the parens patriae title 79 (Fuhrmann 1963: 508) . So, the conduct arising from clementia is ignoscere, 80 suitable for expressing humanitas, 81 misericordia 82 and clementia 83 and thereby the border between these concepts and virtues fades away, and misericordia and clementia become the form of manifestation of humanitas Caesaris.
84 To achieve this goal, i.e. the pardon to be obtained for Ligarius, the orator, acknowledging the dictator's superiority, praises Caesar's clementia and in his view he deserves praise primarily because after his victory he did not keep this virtue out of the reach of his enemies either, 85 which is a suffi cient cause for his former enemies evaluating and experiencing his victory as benefi t too. 86 By praising Caesar's clementia he introduces the part in which he speaks about his own former hostile emotions towards Caesar 87 in order to make capital of it for his defendant: Ligarius is more worthy of Caesar's clementia than the orator himself because the former has never been hostile to Caesar, his unpleasant situation can be traced back to the unfortunate interplay of circumstances rather than to his own conviction. By that Cicero dresses his own Pompey supporter past in the cloak of praise of Caesar to overcome the dictator's antipathy. At the same time he expresses his conviction that if the leaders of the opposition in Hispania accept the opportunity of peace offered by Caesar, they will not become disloyal to their ideas, instead, they follow the command of common sense -it is, of course, a question whether Cicero's argument, to be more precise, his personality seemed to be authentic in their eyes since they could have possibly considered the orator a traitor.
88
As a matter of fact, it is undecided how much the praise of Caesar's clementia came from Cicero's heart as -in spite of the fact that this time to serve the peace of the community he let himself be used as the tool of Caesar's propaganda -internal reservations and questioning of the superiority of the one-time equal rival could not have vanished without any traces from Cicero's soul. Reference to Caesar as father 89 and denial of the effect his own orator's performance produced on Caesar's decision 90 perhaps did not lack ironic overtones (Rochlitz 1993: 126 ; on the other hand see Walser 1960: 96). Cicero was not likely to have acknowledged the legitimacy of the situation deep inside as he did not give up his ideal of the republican state, yet, he did not openly give voice to his bitterness and criticism, he dressed his conviction in an ambiguous form 91 (Bringmann 1986 : 80; Loutsch 1984: 98 ff.). If Caesar wanted to disguise the trial of Ligarius as offi cial court proceedings, then it can be considered delicate irony masked as fl attery on Cicero's side to refer to the dictator as pater thereby depriving him of his capacity as judge (Bringmann 1980: 80) . He must have chosen deprecatio as the genre of his speech for similar reasons, which is obviously not a genre of court of justice, and, accordingly, neither aequitas, nor iustitia are mentioned in the speech. On the other hand, in spite of slight criticism and irony by which 81 Cicero, Pro Ligario 13. 14. he addresses Caesar's public law position, to obtain clementia and misericordia he uses the dictator's propagandistic concepts for his own purposes (Rochlitz 1993: 126 f.). The concept of sapientia occurs only once in the entire speech and -just as in Pro Marcello -is used as the synonym of political consideration and common sense. 92 The concept of consilium also occurs only once in Pro Ligario and refers both to Caesar and Pompey, and in a negative sense, specifi cally, with respect to upsetting public order. 93 It is due to the different objectives of the two orations that sapientia as the central concept of Pro Marcello is thrust into the background. An oratio every time serves utile: the primary objective of Pro Marcello is to outline the future of the public under the rule of Caesar as primus inter pares, the function of Pro Ligario is to acquit his defendant and to obtain pardon for him. While in Pro Marcello -as its theme covers general political issuesclementia Caesaris is thrust into the background, Pro Ligario deals with the fate of a single person, for this reason the virtue of clementia comes to the front (Rochlitz 1993: 127) . At the same time -as Pro Ligario serves to break the opposition in Hispania and to support Caesar's propaganda aimed at conciliation to be made with his enemies fi ghting there -for this objective the image of Caesar clemens is more suitable than the image of Caesar sapiens, who is willing to let bygones be bygones and forgive. Compared to Marcellus, Ligarius's political weight is rather low -which cannot be necessarily said of Marcellusso it is not specially humiliating for Cicero to ask for pardon for an enemy who has been much below Caesar from the outset. The oration made in favour of Marcellus was delivered in the senate; consequently, it was also a warning addressed to the senators of the need of reconciliation for the sake of common good -so, sapientia was the key concept that connected the audience, i.e. Caesar and the senators. On the contrary, Pro Ligario was delivered on the Forum and the audience was the populus Romanus -so, Cicero thought it was more expedient to put this key word of people's party politics in the centre. 94 Between the orations the political climate in Rome had signifi cantly changed as a result of Caesar's conduct, which left its mark on Cicero's frame of mind sensitive of delicate vibrations (McDermott 1970: 337) . At the same time, Pro Ligario lacks the cautious optimism of Pro Marcello -in the meantime Caesar's triumph had taken place -as if Cicero had given up hope that Caesar sapiens would restore res publica, and trustful tone is replaced by irony (Gelzer 1960: 265) . and from among Cicero's fi fty-two orations quoted by him, he refers most frequently, after Pro Cluentio (sixty-seven quotations) and Pro Milone (sixty-seven quotations), to Pro Ligario (fi fty-three quotations), which is highly noteworthy as contrary to the two hundred 92 Cicero, Pro Ligario 6. 93 Ibid. 19. 94 Cicero, Pro Ligario 6. 37. 95 Cf. Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 10, 1, 112. and two paragraphs of Pro Cluentio and one hundred and fi ve paragraphs of Pro Milone, Pro Ligario consists of merely thirty-eight paragraphs. They are followed in order of reference by Pro Murena (twenty-fi ve quotations), Pro Caelio (twenty-two quotations), the second Philippica (twenty quotations) and the fi rst speech against Catilina (fourteen quotations). In contrast, the fourth speech against Catilina, Pro rege Deiotaro, De imperio Cnaei Pompei, the ninth Philippic, Pro Sestio and the fi rst Verrine oration are quoted only once in each case by Quintilian, and he does not refer to Pro Sulla, De provinciis consularibus and the fi rst Philippica at all. Regarding Pro Ligario Quintilian calls the attention to masterly handling of the facts of the case and exemplary use of irony. 96 Thus, Quintilian considered Pro Ligario, unique of its kind, a work of outstanding signifi cance in training rhetoric (McDermott 1970: 336) .
In the peroratio of Pro Ligario, with huge pathos Cicero enumerates the notables of the order of knighthood who appeared in mourning clothes before Caesar, the people of the house of the Brocchi, L. Marcius, C. Caesetius and L. Corfi dius. 97 The latter, for that matter, could not be present when the speech was delivered as by then he was dead 98 -this error also proves that Cicero could not be directly acquainted with Ligarius and his family: most probably he had never seen the person mentioned by him but, as he was unknown, his absence could not be noticed by many people. This pathetic enumeration of the "notables" constitutes powerful contrast with Caesar, L. Tubero and Pansa, and it becomes clear that Ligarius himself was the least important in the lawsuit. The use of pathos in this form, without cause and therefore turning into the opposite must have made Caesar -and deep inside certainly Cicero himself -smile (McDermott 1970: 337) .
Certain sentences of the oration had a clear meaning to the audience, for example, the point where Cicero describes that all of them threw themselves to the ground at Caesar's feet begging for pardon -including the orator himself. 99 In the account written to Ligarius Cicero depicted that the brothers and relatives of the accused threw themselves to the ground at Caesar's feet and that he spoke in accordance with the case and Ligarius's situation. 100 The audience might have taken Cicero's words literally; the dictator, however, could remember well that Cicero had not thrown himself to the ground at his feet -to what extent Caesar might have taken this phrase as irony cannot be known. Calling the four years younger Caesar pater has again certain troublesome overtones. 101 According to Dio Cassius, Caesar was granted the title parens patriae in 44, 102 and albeit it took place two years after Pro Ligario was delivered, the intitulatio must have become public knowledge earlier (McDermott 1970: 338) . To address Caesar pater could not be easy for Cicero as it was him who was given the title pater patriae in 63 by the senate, on the initiation of Q. Lutatius Catulus, for exposing and suppressing Catilina's plot; also, it is undecided how much this address sounded authentic or ironic from Cicero's mouth to the ear of either the audience or Caesar (Alföldi 1953 : 103 ff.).
Two paragraphs of the oration with clearly demonstrable ironic references and overtones deserve more profound analysis. In the seventh paragraph Cicero relates that after the war had begun and had been mostly fought, he, free from any restraint, upon his own decision, joined the army that took up arms against Caesar. He admits that he is saying all that before the man who, although being aware of this, returned him to the state before they ever met; who sent him a letter from Egypt telling him to stay who he was; who, although being the Roman people's only imperator in the whole empire, let him be the other one (and news on that was brought by Pansa); who allowed him to keep the bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as long as he wanted; and who believed that he would save the orator indeed if he did all that without depriving him of any of his titles. 103 At fi rst hearing or reading, Cicero's words seem fl attering effusions, which Caesar was not in want of these days; yet, even if nobody else did, the dictator certainly discovered the irony hidden between the lines. It is worth comparing the content exposed here with Cicero's letters written in the relevant period between November 48 and August 47, primarily to Atticus.
The fi rst sentence of the paragraph seems to be true, however, the fi ve elements following it need to be analysed more profoundly. The statement on pardon granted by Caesar is true as on 17 December 48 Caesar gave instructions to Dolabella to write a letter to Cicero: he may return to Italy. This permit had signifi cance because M. Antonius as magister equitum banned Cicero by name from Italy. 104 When in August 47 Cicero received Caesar's letter, he was unable to decide how much he could rely on what was written in it and how secure returning would be. 105 Only the meeting at the end of September 47 convinced Cicero that he could leave Brundisium and return home. In other words, only after the meeting did Caesar give him back to the state. In those days Cicero wrote several letters to Caesar's infl uential men, so, among others, to Balbus and Oppius 106 and Caesar himself, and in this letter he tried to fi nd excuses for his brother, Quintus for joining Pompey. 107 Although on 12 th August 47 Cicero received a highly generous letter (litterae satis liberales) from Caesar, he gave an account of this to Terentia, yet -as it has been already mentioned -this did not dispel his fears. 108 It is not probable that this writing referred to in a somewhat cold tone is identical with the letter written from Egypt that was mentioned in the letter. Thus, there is a good chance of presuming that the letter from Egypt is mere fi ction and Caesar could be very much aware of that too. The bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as badges of power and the person of Pansa are referred to only once but not at the same place in the correspondence from this period, 109 however, without the additional information provided in Pro Ligario. Most probably it was Caesar and Pansa who were surprised the most at the news purportedly brought by Pansa -and disclosed by Cicero (McDermott 1970: 341) .
The statement that Caesar offered Cicero imperator's offi ce was probably based on the presumption that even at their meeting in September 47 Caesar made an attempt at winning Cicero over to supporting his politics, Cicero, however, refused to take part actively in public matters. 110 It was always Caesar's more or less confessed yet never actually realised desire to win the support and acknowledgement of older senators in higher ranks -and Cicero had a special place among those whose sympathy he tried to obtain. In 60, by the mediation of Balbus, Caesar offered Cicero the opportunity of joining the fi rst triumvirate, 111 and in July 59 he urged him to accept the offi ce of legate in Gallia offered by him, 112 which Cicero again refused. 113 In March 49 Caesar as imperator sent a letter to Cicero, whom he addressed also by the title of imperator, in order to win his support but he did not succeed. 114 All this clearly proves that Caesar judged Cicero's infl uence in public matters and the moral weight of his political standpoint both more favourably and more realistically than several modern historians (McDermott 1970: 342) .
Taking all the above into consideration, we can presume that Caesar had the meeting with Cicero in Brundisium organised for a defi nite cause, 115 and for such a cause that he did not want to disclose in a letter. With good sense William C. McDermott makes it probable that he wanted to entrust Cicero as magister equitum to administer Italy for the period of time while he was busy with the campaign in Africa; he probably offered him, owing to his activity in Cilicia, the opportunity to retain the triumph that Cicero had longed for, 116 likewise the status of patrician, which he later granted to several people, 117 for example, to Octavianus too, 118 and, in his absence, the rank of princeps/primus rogatus in the senate, which Cicero most probably enjoyed as senator consularis in 62 and 60. If Cicero had accepted this invitation, beside the unus imperator he would have been alter imperator indeed (McDermott 1970: 343) .
Modern historiography has often tried to doubt Cicero's practical skills in public administration/politics, in spite of his successful activity as proquaestor, consul in Sicily and proconsul in Cilicia. That Caesar had much better opinion of Cicero's qualities is proved by his offers repeated several times. In 47 the opportunities offered by Caesar would have raised Cicero again to the forefront of politics, on the one hand, and, would have posed him a worthy challenge that he would have been able to meet properly, on the other -however, he was far from being so uninhibited, opportunist, thirsty of power and glory as his Antique and modern critics would like to present him. Probably listening to his inner conviction, Cicero refused the offered post -which he gave no account of either to Atticus or anybody else -and told his friends no more than Caesar had provided him with the opportunity of returning home. 119 Although in a negative context, Dio Cassius brings up that Cicero had not become magister equitum. 120 Also, Dio Cassius puts the statement into Q. Fufi us Calenus's mouth that Cicero, after having been granted pardon and patrician's rank by Caesar -the latter statement is obviously not true -he ungratefully assassinated him; not himself but by instigating others to commit the assassination. 121 These two loci clearly supports that Caesar might have made an offer with this kind of content to Cicero in order to win his support, and, nevertheless, news about this must have somehow leaked out
